Insecure biosafety labs, deceptive WHO, lying virologists and failing surveillance of sneaky viruses

You will never again (unconditionally) trust scientists, health officials and corporate media after reading this:

The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: Covid-19 may have originated in a Wuhan lab

If you still believe that the Establishment is always telling the truth watch this video at 13:09 – 16:49:

Fauci Squirms Over Lab Leak Questions

Jimmy Dore is biased but in the video clips linked above he just showed two talks with Fauci, so critics can’t question that. However if you nevertheless are a diehard believer in the Establishment and therefore dogmatically conclude that institutions such as WHO and universities will never lie to you, then read this paper:

Laboratory Escapes and “Self-fulfilling prophecy” Epidemics

By: Martin Furmanski MD

Scientist’s Working Group on Chemical and Biologic Weapons

Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation

February 17, 2014

The danger to world or regional public health from the escape from microbiology laboratories of pathogens capable of causing pandemics, or Potentially Pandemic Pathogens (PPPs) has been the subject of considerable discussion. …

This paper presents an historical review of outbreaks of PPPs or similarly transmissible pathogens that occurred from presumably well-funded and supervised nationally supported laboratories. It should be emphasized that these examples are only the “tip of the iceberg” because they represent laboratory accidents that have actually caused illness outside of the laboratory in the general public environment. The list of laboratory workers who have contracted potentially contagious infections in microbiology labs but did not start community outbreaks is much, much longer. The examples here are not “near misses;” these escapes caused real-world outbreaks. (…)

Example #1: British smallpox escapes, 1966, 1972, 197 (…)

Example #2: The “re-emergence” of H1N1 human influenza in 1977. (…)

Western virologists quietly let the matter of a laboratory escape origin for the 1977 H1N1 virus drop from discussion, out of an abundance of scientific caution, and also out of an eagerness not to offend the Russian and Chinese scientists, whose early gestures of cooperation in worldwide influenza surveillance system were very important to foster, because such cooperation would allow tracking influenza globally. (…)

Only since 2009-2010 did major papers begin to state directly the 1977 emergence of H1N1 influenza was a laboratory related release: “The most famous case of a released laboratory strain is the re-emergent H1N1 influenza A virus which was first observed in China in May of 1977 and in Russia shortly thereafter.” The paper made this statement in part because the continued “agnostic” approach to the 1977 re- emergence introduced unacceptable errors in calculating the genomic divergence dates for influenza virus strains.

Public awareness of the 1977 H1N1 pandemic and its likely laboratory origins has been virtually absent. Virologists and public health officials with the appropriate sophistication were quickly aware that a laboratory release was the most likely origin, but they were content not to publicize this, aware that such embarrassing allegations would likely end the then nascent cooperation of Russian and Chinese virologists, which was vital to worldwide influenza surveillance. An abundance of caution in making such suggestions was also in their own self-interest. The 1976 “swine flu” alarm and subsequent immunization program that proved to be unneeded caused 532 cases of Guillain-Barre syndrome and 32 deaths. It was widely considered a misadventure, and had severely damaged the public and political credibility of the virology and public health communities. An acknowledgement of a pandemic originating from their laboratories would have only worsened it. …

“Perhaps an even more serious consequence [of the 1976 swine flu episode] was the accidental release of human-adapted influenza A (H1N1) virus from a research study, with subsequent resurrection and global spread of this previously extinct virus, leading to what could be regarded as a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ epidemic.”(Zimmer 2009)

Example #3 Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis in 1995 (…)

From 1938 to 1972, the VEE vaccine was causing most of the very outbreaks than it was called upon to control, a viscous cycle indeed, and another example of “self- fulfilling prophecy” outbreaks. (…)

However, in 1995 a major VEE epizootic and epidemic hit Venezuela and Colombia, with a type IC virus also the cause. There were at least 10,000 human VEE cases with 11 deaths in Venezuela and an estimated 75,000 human cases in Colombia, with 3,000 neurological complications and 300 deaths. Household attack rates ran 13- 57% and VEE virus was isolated from 10 stillborn or miscarried human fetuses.

Full genomic studies identified the 1995 virus as identical to an 1963 isolate with no sign that this virus had been circulating and the acquiring small genetic mutations indicative of replicating in hosts for 28 years. It was another case of “frozen evolution.” But it could not be another case of an outbreak caused by a defective inactivated VEE vaccine, because the 1963 type IC VEE virus had never been used to make a vaccine. … (…)

It is clear that laboratory strains of VEE virus have a decades-long established habit of re-appearing showing “frozen evolution,” and causing “self-fulfilling prophecy” epidemics. It is clear that escape of laboratory strains of this virus through faulty vaccines has occurred multiple times in the past. Strong circumstantial evidence exists for an inadvertent escape in 1995, and a re-emergence in 2000 is without explanation.

Example 4: SARS laboratory escapes outbreaks after the SARS epidemic (…)

SARS has not naturally recurred, but there have been six separate “escapes” from virology labs studying it: one each in Singapore and Taiwan, and in four distinct events at the same laboratory in Beijing.

… Investigation revealed multiple shortcomings in infrastructure, training and observed procedures at the laboratory, and remedial actions were ordered. (…)

… WHO chose to parse its words to avoid offending members. Perhaps distinguishing between a primary laboratory infection and secondary spread into a community “outbreak,” it chose to treat the risk as hypothetical, stating in the introduction:

“The possibility that a SARS outbreak could occur following a laboratory accident is a risk of considerable importance, given the relatively large number of laboratories currently conducting research using the SARS-CoV or retaining specimens from SARS patients. These laboratories currently represent the greatest threat for renewed SARS-CoV transmission through accidental exposure associated with breaches in laboratory biosafety.”

The hypothetical outbreak was not long in coming.

On April 22, 2004 China reported a suspected case of SARS in a 20-year-old nurse who fell ill April 5 in Beijing. The next day it reported she had nursed a 26-year- old female laboratory researcher who had fallen ill in March 25. Still ill, the researcher had traveled by train to her home in Anhui province where she was nursed by her mother, a physician, who fell ill on April 8 and died April 19. The researcher had worked at the Chinese National Institute of Virology (NIV) in Beijing, which is part of China’s Center for Disease Control (CDC), and which was a major center of SARS research. …

Several Chinese and international groups investigated the outbreak at the NIV, and identified in retrospect two additional SARS laboratory infections at the NIV that had previously gone unrecognized and had begun in February 2004. A joint China CDC and WHO investigation found many shortcomings in biosecurity at the NIV, and traced the specific cause of the outbreak to an inadequately inactivated preparation of SARS virus that was used in general (not biosecure) laboratory areas in the NIV, including the one in which the two primary cases worked. It had not been tested to confirm its safety after inactivation, as it should have been. The WHO also found more general shortcomings in the handling of live SARS virus and a lack of surveillance of laboratory personnel for laboratory infections. (…)

Interestingly, the virology community is still reticent to discuss laboratory escapes: despite the considerable alarm these escapes created in the public health community and the participation of US CDC personnel in their investigation, they go unmentioned in the “10 years after” historical review of SARS by the CDC.

Example 5: Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) from Pirbright 2007 (…)

On August 3, 2007 an outbreak of FMD was reported on a farm in the UK, initially with at least 38 cases in cattle identified. Quarantine measures were introduced and an investigation begun, with culling of surrounding livestock. Most countries banned UK livestock and meat exports. The virus was quickly identified as a strain that had caused a 1967 outbreak in the UK, but was not currently circulating in animals anywhere. Another case of “frozen evolution.” However, this outbreak was 2.8 miles (4.6 kms) south of Pirbright, where the only two facilities in the UK that were authorized to hold FMD virus were located. One was the UK Institute for Animal Health (IAH), the other Merial, a commercial veterinary FMD vaccine manufacturer. They both used the 1967 FMD strain, the Merial facility in large amounts (10,000 l) for vaccine manufacture. …

However, on September 12, 2007 FMD was again reported, this time 30 miles north of Pirbright, again with the same 1967 strain of FMD. From September 18-30 multiple additional outbreaks of FMD appeared in the same area. A national embargo on all animal shipment was imposed, and new surveillance zones expanded rapidly until, overlapping they encompassed a portion of Heathrow Airport and were cut across by the major M4, M3 and M25 motorways. Rapid (real-time) genomic analysis had been ongoing during this outbreak, and indicated a single escape of FMD from Pirbright, … (…)

FMD is such an easily transmitted virus with such potential to cause massive economic damage it would appear that manipulating it in a virology laboratory in a FMD free area is manifestly fraught with hazard. Particularly when it might escape by an “invisible” breach in biosafety as it did at Pirbright, and where it might lurk undetected despite heavy surveillance as it did between the two outbreaks.

… Currently a replacement facility under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) is under construction in Manhattan, KS. The move of FMD research to the agricultural heartland of the US was opposed by many groups, including the GAO, but DHS decided on the KS location and construction is ongoing. So much for learning from other’s experience. (…)

It is hardly reassuring that despite stepwise technical improvements in containment facilities and increased policy demands for biosecurity procedures in the handling of dangerous pathogens, that escapes of these pathogens regularly occur and cause outbreaks in the general environment. Looking at the problem pragmatically, question is not if such escapes will happen in the future, but rather what the pathogen may be and how such an escape will be contained, if indeed it can be contained at all.

Advances in genetic manipulation now allow the augmentation of virulence and transmissibility in dangerous pathogens, and such experiments have been funded and performed, notably in the H5N1 avian influenza virus. The advisability of performing such experiments at all, and particularly in laboratories placed at universities in heavily populated urban areas, where laboratory personnel who are potentially exposed are in daily contact with a multitude of susceptible and unaware citizens is clearly in question.

If such manipulations should be allowed at all, it would seem prudent to conduct them in isolated laboratories where personnel are sequestered from the general public and must undergo a period of “exit quarantine” before re-entering civilian life. Such isolated “detached duty”, while inconvenient for the lifestyle of virologists, is hardly foreign to them, since many experience prolonged periods of inconvenient and dangerous field work in the collection of viruses in the field, and certainly many other natural scientists do prolonged and isolated field work as well. The “inconvenience” barrier that requiring such isolation may present to principal investigators and other personnel may act as a natural screening factor to insure that dangerous manipulations to dangerous pathogens are only undertaken when genuinely indicated.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: Logo

You are commenting using your account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s